The Aswat al-Iraq news agency reported a mixed response from the Iraqi people as a whole to the news of the cabinet`s approval of the agreement. Residents of the city of Sadr in Baghdad, a stronghold of Muqtada al-Sadr, said they thought the agreement had been signed too quickly,[27] while a wider ”vox pop” of Iraqis across the country said they believed the deal would become a point of contention. [28] This second attempt to discuss a lasting bilateral relationship between the two countries provides an opportunity to review the 2007 Declaration of Principles and the 2008 SFA in light of the lessons learned by both sides in the following years. But the challenges Iraq faced then and now are much the same: corruption, a political system that serves the interests of the few at the expense of the majority, a regulatory framework that stifles rather than strengthens and supports an entrepreneurial culture, and a public sector that employs millions of people while repeatedly failing to provide basic services to people. Then, as now, the responsibility for overcoming these challenges lies primarily with the Iraqi government. Then, as now, a strategic dialogue with the United States will not provide sufficient political will or incentives for Iraq`s political elites to address these challenges. Only the Iraqis can do that. It is in the interest of the Iraqi government and the U.S. government to develop communication strategies to engage with broader segments of Iraqi society during the talks. Public briefings by both sides on dialogue consultations, as well as regular consultations with leaders of youth groups and civil society organizations on issues covered by the discussions, should be an integral part of the dialogue process.

The timing of dialogue in the run-up to the US elections will influence its pace as the Trump administration seeks to reach an end-of-game agreement in Iraq before November 2020. As in 2009, a new US administration in January 2021 will focus less on its bilateral relations with Iraq than it already does, prioritizing domestic public health and economic issues and leaving little political scope for foreign policy. The Obama administration was more interested in exiting than in maintaining bilateral relations with Iraq. He turned his eyes to the country`s internal affairs and, in some cases, even turned a blind eye to political leaders like Nouri al-Maliki as they engaged in the worst kind of sectarian politics and ultimately created the political and security conditions that allowed isis`s emergence. The fight against ISIS in 2014-2017 transformed U.S.-Iraqi relations by focusing on military and security issues, and far less attention was paid to other connections that were supposed to define a lasting relationship between the two countries as part of the 2008 SFA. As in 2007-08, the U.S. government will begin a dialogue in the middle of a presidential election season. This will not affect the main orientation of US positions in the dialogue, especially because the current administration and a possible Biden administration do not differ significantly on whether they want a lasting bilateral relationship that goes beyond the military sphere. The main difference between the two revolves around their Iranian policy. While this administration has not developed an Iraqi policy and has always viewed Iraq through the prism of its ”maximum pressure” strategy against Iran, a Biden administration will most likely ease much of the pressure on Iran that the Trump administration exerted early in its term.

This would reduce tensions between the US and Iran throughout the region (including Iraq), encourage Tehran to curb the actions of its proxies in Iraq against US assets, and create space for the Iraqi government to implement certain security and economic reforms. However, this does not mean that Tehran will reduce its influence in Iraq`s political and security affairs or agree to place the weapons of its armed proxies under state control. The protests, which began last October and were mostly led and organized by shia youth, have heightened Tehran`s fears that anti-Iranian Iraqi nationalism will remain strong, even in constituencies it deems friendly. A presence of armed militias in Iraq, whose loyalty to Tehran is undeniable, will remain their best bet in the short and medium term against Iraq, which will never again become a threat to its internal security. Regarding the Security Partnership, the two countries acknowledged that, given the significant progress made in combating the ISIS threat in the coming months, the United States will continue to reduce forces from Iraq and discuss with the Iraqi government the status of the remaining forces, as the two countries focus on developing a bilateral security relationship. which is based on strong mutual interests. The United States reaffirmed that it does not seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq, as previously agreed in the 2008 SFA, which provides for security cooperation based on mutual agreements. The Government of Iraq is committed to protecting the military personnel of the International Coalition and the Iraqi facilities in which they are housed, in accordance with international law and the specific provisions of their presence decided by both countries. The leaders of both countries wanted to draw attention beyond security cooperation, but the future of U.S. troops in Iraq was the topic of most interest to the media, Iraqis, and regional actors. The strategic dialogue ended with the reaffirmation that U.S. troops are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, which has pledged to protect anti-ISIS coalition personnel, including U.S.

troops. The two countries agreed ”that there will be no U.S. forces with a combat role in Iraq until December 31, 2021.” Military personnel will continue to play a ”training, advisory, support and intelligence role.” U.S. officials stress that this dialogue is based on the SFA and is not another SOFA. Like the 2007 talks, the U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue aims to define and agree on fundamental principles for lasting bilateral relations. Discussions will focus on four main aspects of the relationship: political, security, economic and cultural relations. As in 2008, the United States sees dialogue as a way to move bilateral relations from a limited focus on security and military-military relations to a broader, multifaceted relationship between the two countries. On 16 November 2008, the Iraqi Cabinet approved the agreements; on 27 November, the Iraqi parliament ratified it; On December 4, the Iraqi Presidential Council approved the security pacts. [24] Both agreements protect US interests in the Middle East, help the Iraqi people stand on their own two feet, and strengthen Iraqi sovereignty. Like the nature of the United States. The presence of troops is changing, U.S.-Iraqi relations have opportunities, but they also face various challenges that can be better addressed by strengthening this strategic partnership. It was Kadhimi`s second visit to the White House in less than a year, and he also met with President Nancy Pelosi and other members of Congress.

His visit follows last week`s series of U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogues under the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement and reaffirmed their cooperation in many areas, including security, public health, economic cooperation, energy independence, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and cultural and educational exchanges. .